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a driver has committed the offense of drunk driving, though it after-
ward appears the offense was not committed.
Third, no statutory changes would be required, of course, if the
courts follow the accepted law of arrest, as exemplified by the New
York and Nebraska decisions.3 4 By this view, an arrest based upon
probable cause is lawful, and the license of a driver so arrested could
be revoked if he refuses to submit to a chemical test, regardless of
the outcome of any subsequent criminal proceeding.
Since the general powers of arrest are presently adequate under
existing statutes, when interpreted properly, it seems there is no justi-
fication for broadening them. It is therefore submitted that the third
approach is the most logical approach to fair and effective enforcement
of Implied Consent Laws.
JIMMY D. Bowir
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE UNDER McNABB-MALLORY
For the past several years an interesting development in the ap-
plication of the McNabb-Mallory' exclusionary rule has been taking
place in the federal judiciary. This court-born rule excludes all con-
fessions procured in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,2 and requires the bringing of all arrested persons before a
committing magistrate without unreasonable delay.3 The rule has
gradually been expanded into areas of derivative evidence, that is, evi-
dence discovered from information contained in statements and con-
fessions. One specific type of such derivative evidence of considerable
interest is testimony of a witness whose identity was learned solely
as a result of a period of illegal detention.
In the recent case of Smith v. United States,4 the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia was presented with a rather
31Supra note 21.
1McNabb v. United States, 3 8 U.S. 332 (1943); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.
410 (1948); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
Fed. R. Grim. P. 5(a).
3Ibid. "An officier making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint
or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before
any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against
the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought
before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith."
'324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
1964] CASE COMMENTS 325
novel question. While walking through a park, Miksa Merson, a sixty-
five year old resident of the District of Columbia, was attacked by
two men, robbed, and beaten to death. The defendants, Smith and
Bowden, were arrested. Interrogation during the period of their de-
tention produced the victim's watch, the confessions of both defen-
dants, and the identity of a witness to the crime.5 Smith was finally
brought before a magistrate some sixty hours after his arrest.
At the trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce the confessions,
the victim's watch, and the witness Holeman's testimony. All three
were objected to under the McNabb-Mallory rule. The court ruled
that due to the unnecessary delay in arraignment the confessions and
the watch were inadmissible, but held that the testimony of the wit-
ness Holeman was admissible.6
The Circuit Court in a two-one decision upheld the District
Court's admission of Holeman's testimony. The majority reasoned
that the testimony was so far removed from the illegal detention
that it did not provide a rational basis for exclusion.7 The Court dis-
tinguished between real evidence and a witness's testimony; the evi-
dentiary value of the former is obvious upon discovery; while that
of the latter is manifest only if and when the individual witness de-
cides to tell the truth. The human personality and free will of the wit-
ness, which alone determine what testimony will be given, is said to
be an intervening factor sufficient to free any actual testimony from
the tainted source.8
'The appellants, Smith and Bowden, were arrested for questioning about
another robbery. When the victim failed to identify either man, Bowden was re-
leased. Smith, however, was held overnight for presentation in the police lineup.
The following morning at the lineup, a detective working on the Merson case
became interested in Smith and began interrogating him. The next day, and while
in custody, Smith confessed to the Merson crime and along with Bowden (who
had again been arrested) named one Holeman as a witness to it. A watch was taken
from Bowden which later was identified as belonging to Merson. After arraign-
ment Bowden signed a second confession.
OUnited States v. Smith, 31 F.R.D. 553 (D.D.C. 1962). The court declared that
while it believed the testimony to be subject to exclusion under McNabb-Mallory
reasoning, it was in doubt as to the continuing validity of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine. The court's uncertainty was due to the decision in
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962) where the "fruit" argu-
ment was upheld, but even so, the court allowed testimony procured solely through
leads obtained during an illegal detention. The details of this case are more fully
discussed later in the body of this comment.
7324 F.2d at 881.
sIn concluding, the court pointed out that the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
argument propounded by the defendant had previously been rejected by this same
court in Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961). This case is dis-
cussed more fully later in the body of this comment.
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The basis of all exclusionary rules, regardless of whether they per-
tain to illegal search and seizure, coerced confessions, or illegal de-
tention, is the need to protect the fundamental liberties of the indi-
vidual citizen against unjust police interference.0 Such rules are formu-
lated with the idea that if the benefits from violations of these liberties
are denied, the incentive to employ these procedures will be removed.
The relation between the exclusionary rule is apparent upon an
historical analysis of these protections1o It is significant that in most of
the major decisions involving admissibility in the detention cases, the
courts revert back to the search and seizure cases for support. By vir-
tue of a common purpose, a common reasoning, and a common re-
sult, there is in effect but one exclusionary rule.1'
The underlying principles concerning the exclusion of derivative
evidence stem from search and seizure cases.' 2 The rule formed there
is that if there is proof of the primary illegality, any evidence derived
'As to illegal search and seizure: "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to
repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (196o).
As to coerced confessions: "[T]he admission into evidence of confessions which
are involuntary .... cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are un-
likely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an under-
lying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law; that ours is an accusatorial
and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt
by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its
charges against an accused out of his own mouth." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
584, 540-41 (1961)-
As to illegal detention: "Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must
with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, con-
stitutes an important safeguard-not only in assuring protection for the innocent
but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves
to a progressive and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement checks
resort to those reprehensible practices known as the 'third degree' which, though
universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into use." McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 843-44 (1943).
"Perhaps the best statement of the fundamental relationship was made by
Justice Clark when he declared: "We find that, as to the Federal Government, the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the states, the freedom from unconscion-
able invasions of privacy and freedom from convictions based upon coerced con-
fessions do enjoy as 'intimate relation' in their perpetuation of 'principles of hu-
manity and civil liberty [secured]. . .only after years of struggle,' ... They express
'supplementing phases of the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate
large areas of personal privacy'." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (g6i).
21 For a detailed study of the exclusionary rule and the interrelation among these
three areas, see Wolf, A Survey of the Expanded Exclusionary Rule, 32 Geo. Wash L.
Rev. 193 (1963).
-Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Nardone v.
United States, 3o8 U.S. 338 (1939).
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solely from that illegal source will be excluded unless the causal con-
nection between the original illegality and the proffered evidence
was so attenuated as to free the evidence from its tainted origin.'2
Of course, if the evidence was obtainable from an independent source,
this basis for suppression would not be operative.14 More recently, Mr.
Justice Brennan stated the rule as follows:
"[T]he more apt question in such a case is 'whether, grant-
ing establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploita-
tion of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distin-
guishable to be purged of the primary taint'.' u
Very few cases have arisen involving the admissibility of derivative
evidence when the evidence offered is in the form of a witness's testi-
mony. Until recently, all the cases involved leads gained by illegal
searches and seizures. The first seems to be the Illinois case of People
v. Martin,'6 where in an abortion prosecution it was held to be re-
versible error to admit the testimony of witnesses whose names and
addresses have been discovered solely through an illegal search of the
defendant's premises. In People v. Albea,'7 the same court's views on
the propriety of excluding such testimony were expressed as follows:
"[W]e cannot be unmindful of the principles established by
long precedent which have sought to preserve the sanctity of
the home and the right of privacy of the individual merely be-
cause the evidence has been changed from inanimate to animate
form. It has been held that an illegal search cannot later be jus-
tified by the discovery of contraband property.... We can see
no reason for a different rule in this case when the ends of jus-
tice sought to be maintained are the same."' 8
'Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
"'Ibid. The procedure followed by the courts is explained thusly: The burden
at first is on the accused to prove the primary illegality. Once that is accomplished
the court must give the defendant opportunity to prove that the evidence objected
to was a "fruit" of that illegality. If this is done, the government must convince
the court that the evidence had an origin independent of the illegal act.
2'Vong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). For examples of admis-
sibility and inadmissibility of evidence under this reasoning see McGuire, Evi-
dence of Guilt, 221-22 (1959).
10382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942).
21 Ill. 2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277 (1954).
23118 N.E.2d at 279-8o. Here the witness was not found by leads procured dur-
ing the illegal search, but was herself discovered during such a search. The quoted
passage is offered to explain the thinking of the court as concerns the admissibility
of human evidence illegally procured, since in the Martin case, supra note 17, the
court failed to clarify this distinction.
1964]
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In Abbott v. United States,19 a District of Columbia case, an illegal
search of a suspected bawdy house produced two patrons, and at the
police station both admitted the nature of the business carried on
inside. The lower court allowed a police officer to testify as to these
admissions on the ground that they were too remotely connected
with the search to be considered illegally obtained. The appellate
court reversed on the ground that these men were brought to the at-
tention of the police as a direct result of the illegal search and not by
information independently obtained.20
While Mapp v. Ohio2' presumably subjects all jurisdictions to a
uniform rule of exclusion in search and seizure cases, such uniformity
has not existed in the detention cases. 22 The McNabb-Mallory rule
applies only to the federal administration of criminal justice,23 but al-
most every state has a statutory counterpart to Rule 5(a).24 Only Michi-
gan, however, has gone so far as to exclude evidence obtained in vio-
lation of its statute.25 In the other states, delay in arraignment is but
one of several factors considered in determining admissibility.26 The
Supreme Court has refused to interfere with these state illegal de-
tention decisions.27
138 A.2d 485 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958).
21See also People v. Mickelson, 3o Cal. Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658 (1963); Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), where police testimony as to what was over-
heard through a listening device hidden during an illegal invasion was suppressed;
and McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (ist Cir. 1955), where the court refused
to draw any distinction between the introduction of illegally obtained evidence and
testimony of objects illegally observed.
-1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22n the field of coerced confessions only California excludes evidence obtained
from leads arising out of such a confession. Cf. People v. Ditson, 2o Cal. Rptr.
165, 369 P.2d 714 (1962).
2'-he Supreme Court has declined to make the Constitution a basis for ex-
clusion in illegal detention cases, but instead exercised its supervisory powers over
the federal judiciary in instituting the rule. Mallory v. United States, Upshaw v.
United States, and McNabb v. United States, supra note 1.
-'For a list of these states see 318 U.S. at 342.
TPeople v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (196o); "[A]n unnecessary
and so unlawful delay of compliance with either of said sections 13 and 26 [of the
Michigan Code of Criminal Procedure], when done for prolonged interrogatory
purposes and without proven justification of the delay, [cites Mallory] renders invol-
untary and so inadmissible whatever confessional admissions the detained person
may have made while so unlawfully detained." 1o2 N.W.2d at 742. See People v.
Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W.2d 8o8 (1962), where the above rule is seemingly
limited. However, see People v. McCager, 367 Mich. 116, 116 N.W.2d 205 (1962)
where the rule of Hamilton is restated.
"Annot., i L. Ed. 2d 1735, 1747-48 (1957).
"See Holt v. City of Richmond, 204 Va. 364, 131 S.E.2d 394 (1963); cert. denied,
376 U.S. 917 (1964); where the court admitted that the defendant was illegally de-
tained, but convicted him in spite of this violation of his rights.
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Admissibility of derivative evidence in illegal detention cases, as
distinguished from search and seizure cases, is a relatively recent
problem, and so decisions are few in number. One of the first cases
after Mallory to deal with derivative evidence was Bynum v. United
States, 2s where fingerprints taken during a period of illegal deten-
tion were suppressed. In declaring the exclusion, the court said: "If
one such product of illegal detention is proscribed [confessions under
Malloiy], by the same token all should be proscribed." 29 On re-trial, 30
a set of fingerprints obtained from the F.B.I. was admitted into evi-
dence. The court found no derivative evidence problem involved in
this situation, since the fingerprints were obtained from an indepen-
dent legal source.
Payne v. United States,31 also from the District of Columbia, was
the next case, to be decided in this area. Here the victim of a swindle
pointed out the fleeing defendant to a policeman who gave chase
and captured him. Later, during a period of illegal detention, the
victim identified the defendant, who confessed to the swindle. Both
the confession and the identification were held inadmissible. The
complaining witness, however, was allowed, over objection, to iden-
tify the defendant in the courtroom. The admission of this testi-
mony was upheld by the Court of Appeals, it being under the impres-
sion that the second Bynum 32 case had rejected the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" argument. 3 Since the second Bynum case made no
mention of such a rejection, the Payne decision casts some doubt on
the continuing validity of the "fruit" argument.
The derivative evidence question was again brought up in the
District of Columbia Circuit in Killough v. United States,3 4 but this
case did nothing to clear up the confusion. The defendant, during a
period of illegal detention, made a confession and told where the
murder victim's body could be found. While the confession was ex-
cluded,35 the District of Columbia Circuit Court refused to decide the
2262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
-JId at 467.
'Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 196o).
12.94 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
:-Supra note 3o.
c_9- F.2d at 726-27. The court claims that in Bynum the fingerprints were
obtained from the F.B.I. only because the police knew of Bynum's identity as a
result of the fingerprints taken during the illegal detention, therefore the admission
of the fingerprints was a rejection of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument.
3415 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
'After arraignment the defendant signed another confession. The court held
the second confession to be inadmissible as "fruit" of the first. This decision is
based on the similar holding in Jackson v. United States, 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir.
19641
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question of the admissibility of the coroner's testimony concerning
the body because the case was being reversed on the confession
ground.3 6 However, in its opinion, the majority of the Circuit Court
stated that "evidence which is due to a violation by the police of their
duty under Rule 5(a)"37 must be excluded. On remand, the District
Court held such testimony admissible because it in no way connected
the defendant with the body, even though it was a product of the
illegal detention.38 There seems, therefore, to be a basic inconsistency
in this case.
The District Court, in United States v. Smith,39 after noting the
confusion in the cases just discussed, stated:
"Solely because of the uncertainty which these statements leave
in the Court's mind, this court will admit into evidence the
testimony of Holeman. Nevertheless, this Court wants to make
it abundantly clear that in its firm belief, the basic principle
of Mallory, as extended in Killough, is that in order to make
effective the important protections of Rule 5(a), the courts
must exclude all evidence directly produced by a violation of
that Rule.... [T]here appears to this Court to be no rational
basis for distinguishing between a tainted confession which
produces a later confession, and a tainted confession which pro-
duces a witness who participated in the crime."40
Thus we arrive at the principal case with no clear cut principles
upon which to rely coming from previous detention cases. The court
claimed that the Payne and Killough situations are analogous to the
instant case. However, such analogy seems remote. In Payne, the tes-
timony may be taken out of the derivative evidence category as it was
independently derived from the pre-arrest identification to the police
officer and therefore not solely dependent upon the identification at
the police station during the illegal detention. In the principal case,
the challenged testimony had no independent derivation but it en-
tirely resulted from the admission made during the illegal detention.
1959). It should also be noted that the District Court in Smith suppressed a con-
fession after arraignment on similiar ground citing both Jackson and Killough as
authority.
'4Since the majority reversed because they found the post-preliminary hearing
confession inadmissible, four of them refused to discuss the testimony questioned.
The concurring judge would also exclude all evidence of the body and the cor-
oner's testimony. The four dissenting judges were of the belief that such testimony
was admissible.
3'735 F.2d at 246.
**United States v. Killough, 218 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1963).
**United States v. Smith, 31 F.R.D. 553 (D.D.C. 1962).
OlId at 564-65.
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Furthermore, in Payne the identity of the testifying witness did not
come into being solely because of the admissions of the defendant, as
was the case in Smith. Killough would be analogous to the instant case
had the District Court admitted the testimony as a rejection of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" argument. However, that case decided the
question on the grounds that the testimony did not in fact harm the de-
fendant in any way; thus it can be distinguished. The testimony in
Smith certainly was the most damaging evidence against the defen-
dant. Thus the instant case decided that a witness's testimony, as
such, is admissible derivative evidence. The holding is unique: be-
cause a human may decide not to testify to the truth, such possibility
makes admissible evidence which, had it been tangible, would have
been excluded.
It is submitted that the testimony in the instant case is not "suffici-
ently distinguishable" from the illegal detention so as to be "purged
of the primary taint."41 Since the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
protect individual liberties from improper police methods, it is clear
that this reasoning requires the exclusion of such evidence as was ad-
mitted in Smith. Further, it is submitted that the reasoning of the
search and seizure cases provides the better answer. It seems anomalous
that evidence is allowed, which would otherwise have been excluded,
on the ground that some mysterious human element is present. The
human will is no more an attenuating circumstance than the possibility
that a murder weapon, confessed to be hidden in a certain place, may
have disappeared. Such holdings can but encourage illegal detentions
and improper police conduct for the purpose of obtaining leads to
possible witnesses. They open detours around McNabb-Mallory, Mapp,
and the entire exclusionary rule, and by doing so, flaunt the prin-
ciples upon which these decisions were decided.
42
ROBERT L. STONE
41Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488.
-7This comment aims merely to point out the inconsistencies in the cases and
the logical conclusions evident under the McNabb-Mallory reasoning. The soundness
of that reasoning itself is not a point of discussion here as it has already been
subject to much controversial discussion among legal writers.
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